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    <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2173/555</link>
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    <pubDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2013 14:32:24 GMT</pubDate>
    <dc:date>2013-06-19T14:32:24Z</dc:date>
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      <title>On evaluating agents for serious games</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2173/110624</link>
      <description>Title: On evaluating agents for serious games
Authors: Norling, Emma
Description: Full-text of this article is not available in this e-prints service. This article was originally published following peer-review in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, published by and copyright Springer.</description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2009 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>How are physical and social spaces related? - Cognitive agents as the necessary "glue"</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2173/95393</link>
      <description>Title: How are physical and social spaces related? - Cognitive agents as the necessary "glue"
Authors: Edmonds, Bruce
Abstract: The paper argues that in many (if not most) cases, explicitly representing aspects of both physical and social space will be necessary in order to capture the outcomes of observed social processes (including those of spatial distribution). The connection between social and physical spaces for an actor will, almost inevitably involve some aspect of cognition. Thus, unless there is evidence to the contrary it is unsafe to try and represent such social distribution without representing key aspects of cognition linking social and spatial topologies. This argument is demonstrated by two counter-examples: an abstract simulation extending Schelling’s cellular automata model of racial segregation to include the social communication of fear; and a more descriptive simulation of social influence and domestic water consumption. Both models are sufficiently credible that one could not rule similar processes as occurring in reality, but in both the social and physical spaces that the agents are embedded in is critical to the global outcomes.
Description: The original publication is available at http://www.springer.com/</description>
      <pubDate>Sun, 01 Jan 2006 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Worldviews, science and us: philosophy and complexity</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2173/95371</link>
      <description>Title: Worldviews, science and us: philosophy and complexity
Authors: Gershenson, Carlos; Aerts, Diederik; Edmonds, Bruce
Abstract: Scientific, technological, and cultural changes have always had an impact upon philosophy. They can force a change in the way we perceive the world, reveal new kinds of phenomena to be understood, and provide new ways of understanding phenomena. Complexity science, immersed in a culture of information, is having a diverse but particularly significant impact upon philosophy. Previous ideas do not necessarily sit comfortably with the new paradigm, resulting in new ideas or new interpretations of old ideas.&#xD;
&#xD;
In this unprecedented interdisciplinary volume, researchers from different backgrounds join efforts to update thinking upon philosophical questions with developments in the scientific study of complex systems. The contributions focus on a wide range of topics, but share the common goal of increasing our understanding and improving our descriptions of our complex world. This revolutionary debate includes contributions from leading experts, as well as young researchers proposing fresh ideas.</description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 2007 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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      <title>Towards good social science</title>
      <link>http://hdl.handle.net/2173/95370</link>
      <description>Title: Towards good social science
Authors: Moss, Scott; Edmonds, Bruce
Abstract: The paper investigates what is meant by "good science" and "bad science" and how these differ as between the natural (physical and biological) sciences on the one hand and social sciences on the other. We conclude on the basis of historical evidence that the natural science are much more heavily constrained by evidence and observation than by theory while the social sciences are constrained by prior theory and hardly at all by direct evidence. Current examples of the latter proposition are taken from recent issues of leading social science journals. We argue that agent based social simulations can be used as a tool to constrain the development of a new social science by direct (what economists dismiss as anecdotal) evidence and that to do so would make social science relevant to the understanding and influencing of social processes. We argue that such a development is both possible and desirable. We do not argue that it is likely.
Description: Full-text of this article is not available in this e-prints service. This article was originally published in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, published by and copyright University of Surrey, Department of Sociology.</description>
      <pubDate>Sat, 01 Oct 2005 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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      <dc:date>2005-10-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
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